This paper deals with the financing dynamics of innovation. Whatever lines of action are chosen by individuals in a random or uncertain environment, informational asymmetries constitute a relevant departure point in the study of the financing of innovations. Due to the difficulties and costs of collecting the required information, investors rely on the services of financial intermediaries. However, the simplified facts they offer highlight the difficulties of reaching a balancing point in such a context as the agents’ inability to realize a non-cooperative equilibrium generates rationing and restricts innovations. Therefore, by emphasizing the opposition between neoclassical static efficiency and evolutionary viability, we consider the interdependence between innovative plans and their financing conditions on the markets. For a more innovative efficiency, one should diversify the financing and the cover sources of coverage against the risks and consider new financing structures on markets as well as throughout public institutions aiming at the systemic viability of the economic change. JEL G14, G32, O31.